Active & Passive: a bogus distinction?
The
word "euthanasia" sparks emotions at its very pronouncement. For
those in favor, "the good death" is at once a wish, a hope, and a
right. For those opposed the word means the intentional termination of a life
-- a suicide or a murder -- regardless of method or motive. For the sake of
clarification, if not argumentation, let's recognize at the outset that any
decision regarding treatment of the terminally ill is a death decision. Whether
the decision is to effect a full-frontal assault on
the forces that conspire to shorten ones life or to hasten the inevitable,
either option is a choice among options available at the end of life. Once
again, what is new here is the impact of technology: not long ago there were
limited options as death approached, and it approached at an earlier age.
Inevitably, Nature would 'take its course'. Now medical advances and overall
improvement in basic health have increased our longevity -- and now we stay
alive long enough to get cancers that only show up as opportunity and age
allow. Medical advances can now keep any particular body alive; so it is an old
ethical question in a new guise we face: "Should we?"
The
assumption was that if life has an intrinsic value it must always be preserved.
Even for Natural Law this is not necessarily the case. While life has an
inherent value, death is part of the telos of
any living thing. As Callahan pointed out, the denial of the reality of our
finitude is at the root of our core values in American medicine and, as he
predicted, we cannot deny it for long. And so, in the legal
history from Quinlan to Crusan in less than twenty
years we moved from a presumption of an impossible duty to sustain all life to
a precedent to permit the physician to assist in the consultation of ending
one's life. In this process a line has been both drawn and crossed. James Rachels' holds that the line -- a line between active and
passive euthanasia -- ought not to have been drawn in the first place.
The
distinction between two types of euthanasia was proffered as an articulation of
what is acceptable and unacceptable practice. The root is clearly in Natural
Law wherein the obligation to avoid doing an intentional evil is much stronger
than the intention to do good (non-maleficence
vs. beneficence). Accordingly, active interference in the life processes is
deemed impermissible, unless according to principles of double-effect or
totality of the body. Yet not interfering with the death process
(letting nature take its course) is a passive acceptance of our mortal
condition that is permissible (IF there is no proportional benefit to be
gained by a particular course of action). Thus distinctions between two
categories of actions include the following:
|
Passive |
Active |
|
Deciding
NOT to undergo treatment DNR
orders ("do not resuscitate") Proportional
increase in meds as needed (ex.:
in the case of Ca., morphine) |
Suicide
(active termination by patient) Kevorkian's
actions (facilitating pt.) The
case of Elizabeth Bouvier |
To this array further distinctions can be
made as to who makes the decision for treatment: if it was autonomous it
is considered voluntary, and involuntary if not. The latter are clearly the
more problematic:
|
|
Passive |
Active |
|
Voluntary: |
(everything
as per above) |
(everything
as per above) |
|
Involuntary: |
Decisions
involving children, Incompetent
adults, Any
patient in a coma, or "persistent
vegetative state" |
Quinlan:
N.J. court precedent Crusan:
Supreme
Court decision re- garding
nutrition & hydration |
Especially since the Crusan
decision, documentation regarding the patients' expressed intentions about life
sustaining treatment has become crucial in facilitating treatment decisions.
Thus to the array we can add a mediating buffer about "Living Wills"
or "Advanced Directives". These documents effectively move some
decisions from the "involuntary" portion of the grid to the
"voluntary" one, since we act on the patients clear, rational
expressed last intentions.
|
|
Passive |
Active |
|
Voluntary: |
(everything
as per above) |
(everything
as per above) |
|
|
Living
Will |
a.k.a.
Advanced Directives |
|
Involuntary: |
Decisions
involving children, Incompetent
adults, Any
patient in a coma, or "persistent
vegetative state" |
Quinlan:
N.J. court precedent Crusan:
Supreme
Court decision re- garding
nutrition & hydration |
This appeared to be a neat categorization for
ethical and legal discrimination: if an action was autonomous and passive, no
moral, ethical or legal foul was proffered in a decision that "allowed the
patient to die". Even in the non-voluntary category, if the decision is
unchallenged by the medical staff and the patient's family, if it is clear that
no "proportional benefit" to the patient can be gained by initiating
a given course of treatment, then not treating in those cases is also an
acceptable course. The "Active" category then was tainted as active
termination of life, and thus included actions of unjust killing. At the time
prior to Quinlan, it seemed to be a clear separation between acceptable
"passive" euthanasia decisions and "active" euthanasia decisions
that were "god-like" judgements of life and
death. (Passive decisions were NOT referred as euthanasia decisions by the
families and medical staff that supported them, leaving the negative
connotation of the word for non-passive choices)
Prior to Quinlan:
|
|
Passive |
|
Active |
|
Voluntary: |
--
acceptable -- |
|
--
Not acceptable -- |
|
|
Living
Will |
|
a.k.a.
Advanced Directives |
|
Involuntary: |
--
conditionally acceptable -- |
|
--
Not acceptable -- |
Clearly, after the Quinlan case, this
distinction was no longer legally viable. Both moral and legal judgements in this area
were considered suspect. Enter James Rachels with
what appears to be yet another stretched philosophic argument that tries to
muddy-up the waters by erasing the active-passive distinction. Ironically, the
analogy seems to offer an objection to all euthanasia decisions -- but
actually it opened the door wide to consider all such decisions as potentially,
or conditionally, acceptable.
Rachels presents a clear, unambiguous scenario. Is it
permissible to stand by idly while someone drowns though you have the capacity
to save him or her? While legally permissible (or minimally,
"non-prosecutable") such non-action can be heinously immoral. In
fact, in the scenario he presents, such standing-by is akin to actively killing
the innocent person. On the surface this seems to argue that any process,
active or passive, that leads to the death of another is wrong, but this is not
Rachels' position. By calling into question the
validity of the active/passive distinction Rachels is
actually challenging the morality of some passive decisions and re-orienting
the inquiry to consider the beneficence of some active decisions. If one has
decided not to have a potentially life-prolonging operation, and thus has made
a decision not to forestall death, that same decision may be condemning a
patient to a slow and painful demise. In true Utilitarian fashion, if one has
decided to end one's life and ending it sooner is less painful than postponing
the inevitable, Rachels would say the balance falls
in favor of the active choice. The bottom line is that either decision is one
that accepts death -- the only question is how. If active euthanasia is an
option considered humane when provided to animals in pain, then it may indeed
be immoral to not permit that same option for humans. Effectively the
distinction between "good passive" and "bad active" is
erased. Decisions per individual cases are to be weighed out according to the
merits of the case (presumably in a Utilitarian fashion). Whether a patient
opts for assistance in dying in
|
|
Euthanasia
Decisions |
|
Voluntary: |
|
|
|
Living
Wills |
|
Involuntary: |
|
Actually,
it is only fair to point out that "removal of life support" as in the
Quinlan case is no longer viewed as problematic, even by many Natural Law
advocates (including the Catholic Church). When there is little or no benefit
to the patient, when there is no potential to return the patient to an
autonomous state of functioning, life-sustaining measures are not mandated.
This removes the difficulty of trying to decide in advance whether to beginning
a course of treatment (such as intubation) is warranted;
procedures in the ER are aggressively advanced, and withdrawn when no longer
warranted. Again, as in the case of Quinlan, when such measures are withdrawn
and the patient continues to live, Natural Law demands due care and respect to
continue that basic care for as long as needed 9and for Karen Ann, that was nearly a decade).
There are still problems, obviously. Allowing
the option of medical assistance in suicide reverses the presumption of the
practice of medicine to assist in life processes. In an era where treatment
always has a dollar-and-cents aspect to it, this tends to make the poor
implicitly more expendable and less worthy of extensive life care. Because of
our fear of death we may be ineffective in "objectively, rationally and
impartially" weighing out our alternatives. The cost of allowing wholesale
active euthanasia may be to high for our society to
bear, not in an economic sense, but in a societal sense; it may be societies
obligation to protect the sick when they are at their most diminished capacity.
That is why in reaction to the increasing call for euthanasia options the hospice
movement has garnered so much attention. Effectively hospice has shown that
pain management is the real concern with most patients and that when humane
care is provided -- as opposed to framing medical treatment as providing cures
-- patients very often cope well with the dying process.
The emphasis on Care is perfectly in line
with the Feminist critique of ethics in general. ALL of the systems reviewed up
until now have reflected the thinking of the men of the times that articulated
and produced those ethical principles. By nature, men are said to think in
terms of systems, and those systems in ethics tend to emphasis procedures to
determine what is, and what is not, just. Overemphasis on ethics of Justice has
come at the expense of a key moral component, Care. Bypassing the active vs.
passive debate altogether, the ethics of Care contends that the systematic
weighing-out of euthanasia options or the relating of action to principle can
be bypassed by providing basic, and genuine, palliative care. A "return to
Care" is a return to universally recognized virtues and a social
commitment to provide for others as we would want to be provided for.