InfoTrac Web: Expanded Academic ASAP.
Source: Commentary, Sept 2000 v110 i2 p35.
Title: What Is Wrong with Gay Marriage.(silent opposition)
Author: Stanley N. Kurtz
Subjects: Same-sex marriage - Social aspects
Gay couples - Conduct of life
Locations: United States
Electronic Collection: A65014588
RN: A65014588
Full Text COPYRIGHT 2000 American Jewish Committee
A CLEAR majority of the American public opposes same-sex marriage, a
social
reform already making headway in a number of states. And yet this opposition,
though real, is by and large silent. Just prior to the close vote on
"civil
unions" in the Vermont state assembly this past April, a number of
anguished
legislators pleaded for more time. Our society, they said, had only
begun to
consider the full implications of same-sex marriage; how could they
be
expected to make so fateful a decision in the absence of informed and
substantive discussion? But the vote was taken anyway; the Vermont
measure has
passed into law; and still the hoped-for discussion has failed to materialize.
So striking is this general silence that one cannot help wondering about
the
reasons for it. They are not far to seek. In April, just after Reform
rabbis
had been authorized by their movement to conduct same-sex wedding ceremonies,
and as Methodists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians were debating whether
to
do likewise, a story appeared in the New York Times about three respected
and
moderately liberal Protestant theologians known to be opposed to such
a move
who had been invited to air their views on television. All three had
declined
to appear, and on more or less the same grounds: fear of being publicly
smeared as "homophobic."
In a democracy, Tocqueville warned, the threat of social ostracism can
be too
easily turned against minority viewpoints. How curious, then, to see
it being
deployed so effectively today against the majority. True, even a relatively
small group of deeply committed partisans can always impose certain
costs on
its adversaries, and the cause of same-sex marriage is certainly one
to which
gay activists and their allies are deeply committed. True, too, the
positions
espoused by these activists are generally supported by the American
cultural
elite, including the mainstream media, which exercise a powerful censoring
role of their own. But one also senses that the silencing of the majority
would never have been possible were the majority itself more certain
of its
ground.
Although most Americans are indeed opposed to the legalization of same-sex
marriage, large numbers of these same Americans do not consider homosexuality
itself a sin, and they welcome greater tolerance for homosexuals. Favoring
equality, they do not wish to see anyone denied his rights. It is the
seeming
ambiguity in this position that has been seized upon by activists to
stigmatize any opposition to same-sex marriage as evidence of homophobia,
or
prejudice against homosexuals per se. But a hirer way of putting it
would be
to say that we have allowed a muddled understanding of democracy to
subvert
our capacity to speak on behalf of those human forms and traditions
upon which
democracy itself crucially depends.
NOT THAT the arguments in favor of same-sex marriage are themselves
models of
clarity. Quite the contrary: they have shifted with the moment, and
with their
proponents' sense of political expediency.
Perhaps the most articulate of these proponents is the British-born
Andrew
Sullivan, who just over a decade ago launched his campaign for same-sex
marriage in the pages of the New Republic, the magazine of which he
was then
the editor. True to his self-description as a conservative, Sullivan
put
forward a conservative argument. Marriage, he proclaimed, is an institution
worthy of preservation, and society is correct to extend legal advantages
to
couples who choose to live under its formal sanction. For marriage
provides a
counterbalance to sexual adventurism, especially male sexual adventurism,
and
thus serves to encourage the socially beneficial ends of emotional
stability,
economic security, and a healthy environment in which to rear the next
generation. But precisely for that reason, Sullivan concluded, the
legal
benefits of marriage ought to be extended to gays as well, who if anything
stand in even greater need of its ameliorating spirit than do heterosexuals,
and who could contribute most to society if brought under the healing
embrace
of bourgeois respectability.
Would homosexuals actually choose to marry? Sullivan, after all, was
speaking
of a community--his own community--that has put a premium on sexual
promiscuity, as well as on rebellion against everything subsumed under
the
word "proper." Not to worry, he reassured his readers: while some gay
activists and a number of aging radicals might cling to an outdated
notion of
homosexuals as the quintessential outsiders, in the community as a
whole the
impulse to rebel was giving way to the impulse to belong. Indeed, his
"guess"
was that, if only the straight world would accept them, many would
happily
wed--and they might well prove to be more committed marriage partners
than
heterosexuals themselves. At the very least, by turning marriage into
a shared
institution, America could heal the gay/straight rift, make headway
against
the scourge of AIDS, and ensure that a restless and endangered class
of
citizens would be happier, more productive, and better cared for.
Several years later, Sullivan fleshed out this argument in a book, Virtually
Normal, which garnered generally enthusiastic reviews. It also attracted
at
least two vigorous counterresponses: one by James Q. Wilson in COMMENTARY
("Against Homosexual Marriage," March 1996) and a shorter piece by
William J.
Bennett in Newsweek. Bennett raised the interesting possibility that
Sullivan's "guess" might prove wrong--that legalized marriage would
not in
fact domesticate gays but rather the reverse: that an often openly
and even
proudly promiscuous population would fatally undermine an already weakened
institution by breaking the bond between marriage and the principle
of
monogamy. Besides, Bennett asked, once we arbitrarily redefine marriage
to
take in couples of the same sex, what would be the stopping point?
Why not
legalize polygamy, even incest?
This last point Sullivan himself was, in turn, quick to disparage as
irrational fear-mongering, likening it to the disaster scenarios trotted
out
decades earlier during the debate over interracial marriage. "To the
best of
my knowledge," he scoffed in reply to Bennett, "there is no polygamist's
rights organization poised to exploit same-sex marriage and return
the
republic to polygamous abandon."
But at the same time, Sullivan was already beginning subtly to shift
ground.
In the case of heterosexuals, he complained in his response to Bennett,
we
have never been in the habit of making "nitpicking assessments of who
deserves
the right to marry and who does not" (emphasis added); why do so in
the case
of homosexuals? This was a portent of things to come. From urging that
the
benefits of marriage be extended to gays as a matter of society's own
self-interest--that is, in order to tame an antinomian force by, in
effect,
co-opting it--Sullivan and others soon began to build a case for gay
marriage
on the basis of human and civil rights.
Gone now was the earnest contention that marriage both solemnized and
reinforced a worthy moral code. Gone, too, was any serious effort to
show that
gays, if allowed to marry, would adopt that code. In "State of the
Union," a
piece published in the New Republic earlier this year in the wake of
the
Vermont legislature's action, Sullivan conceded in one breath that
many gay
men had no interest in marriage with its expectations of fidelity,
while
insisting in the next that even if they did marry, the impact on the
institution as a whole, given the tiny percentage of homosexuals in
the
population, would be negligible. But all that was beside the point,
which was
one of principle: in a free society, Sullivan declared, we allow anyone
to
marry who so wishes. And although we naturally hope for the best from
all
those marriages, the actual outcome is irrelevant; marriage itself
is an
elementary right, and to deny it to anyone, not only in substance but
in name
(by adopting such halfway measures as domestic partnerships or civil
unions),
is a species of discrimination, pure and simple.
Thus the "debate" so far. To judge by the silence on the other side,
the
proponents of same-sex marriage would seem to have won hands down,
no matter
which argument they happen to base themselves on at any given moment.
In
instructing the state legislature last December to authorize either
same-sex
marriage or, as the closest thing to it, civil unions, Vermont's supreme
court
unabashedly invoked what it called a "recognition of our common humanity"
as
the ground for its decision. "Our common humanity": who could be so
retrograde, or so callous, as to say no to that?
BUT THE fact is that our common humanity has nothing to do with the
case.
After all, we recognize a common humanity with all sorts of people,
some of
them even criminals, to whom we would not consider extending many of
the
normal benefits of society. As a social and legal institution, marriage
exists
not because it is a universal right but only because, historically,
certain
human communities have decided that this particular form of personal
alliance
between a man and a woman both needs and deserves societal encouragement.
In
fact, a rights-based argument, if it were honest, would reject this
social
favoritism altogether, calling instead for the abolition of state-sponsored
marriage and, perhaps, its replacement by contracts in which personal
alliances of any kind would be arranged solely by the parties concerned,
in
whatever number or gender, and with whatever associated responsibilities,
they
saw fit to stipulate.
Of course, advocates of same-sex marriage do not (generally) espouse
so
radical a position. But neither do they concede what is manifestly
the case:
that they already have the same legal right to marry as everybody else--to
marry, that is, members of the opposite sex. What they claim instead
is a new
right: the right to reconfigure the conditions of marriage in such
a way as to
change its very definition, while denying they are doing any such thing.
And
this right to reconfigure marriage in favor of gays is indeed tantamount,
just
as Bennett warned, to a right to reconfigure it in favor of polygamists,
or
pederasts, or practitioners of incest--do we not share a common humanity
with
each of them?--and thus, in effect, to eliminate heterosexual monogamous
marriage as a legal and, ultimately, a social category. As we shall
see, at
least some advocates of same-sex marriage are frank enough to say so.
What we are thrown back on, in other words, are the fundamental questions
of
what marriage is, and what it is for. It was the answers to these questions
that gave rise to the determination in the West to give a privileged
status to
monogamous heterosexual unions in the first place, and even though
those
millennia-old answers may have been momentarily forgotten, or have
fallen into
disrepute, they remain as sound and as compelling as ever.
IN A great many non-Western cultures, polygamy and polyandry (a marriage
of
one woman and several men) have long existed; it is even possible that
the
great majority of human societies throughout history have allowed polygamy
even if most did not practice it. By contrast, monogamous heterosexual
marriage arose for specific reasons, of which the more venerable has
to do
with the complementarity of the sexes and the more recent with the
fundamental
liberal belief in the primacy of the individual. If we begin with the
second
of these, that is only because it is the less controversial.
Societies that practice polygamy tend to be built around life within
groups,
where the rights of the individual are subordinated to the honor and
fate of
the clan or joint family. Marriages in such societies are undertaken
not so
much to join forever with a distinctive beloved but first and foremost
to
further alliances between families and clans, and the children of these
marriages are raised less by their parents alone than by some larger
association of kin. Hillary Clinton's favorite proverb, "It takes a
village to
raise a child," is meaningful in just these sorts of settings, which
may
indeed be stable, and which are certainly complex, but where the chief
source
of authority is not the individual but the group.
That our own society is rather different hardly needs to be demonstrated.
In
the modern period, families in the West are for the most part based
not on
large associations of kin with whom we live cheek by jowl but rather
on deeply
personal ties established over time between two unique individuals.
These
emotionally intimate ties are the fundamental glue of Western marriage,
which
is monogamous not only because it represents the free choice of autonomous
persons but because anything other than monogamy would fatally undercut
the
primacy of the individual and force us back either into social chaos
or into
the straitjacket of large, rule-bound groups.
To be sure, individualism like every other form of human expression
can be
carried to excess, and in ways that promote its own subversion. The
same
regard for our individual uniqueness that pushes in favor of romantic
love
can, if unbridled by other considerations, make us chafe at any restrictions
whatsoever on our freedom, enticing us to believe that we can have
whomsoever
we desire, whenever it strikes our fancy, and no matter what prior
obligations
we may have undertaken to any one person. "The heart wants what it
wants,"
said Woody Allen famously, at a moment when he was upending his own
family
arrangements dramatically. But that too is precisely why society has
stepped
in to reinforce, through the legalized institution of marriage, the
notion of
committed romantic love: that is, the side of individualism that draws
men and
women together rather than the side that pulls them restlessly apart.
Its
interest in doing so goes beyond the stake every society has in settled
order;
the fact is that the continuity of these two-person bonds is, once
again, all
that stands between our children and chaos.
What, one may ask, does this have to do with homosexuality? After all,
as
proponents of same-sex marriage remind us, gay couples can be drawn
together
by romantic love, and stay together, too. And at least some homosexual
couples
have children as well--through adoption or artificial insemination,
or from
previous marriages. Not only that, but nobody bars heterosexual couples
who
are sterile or childless from getting or staying married. Maybe there
is good
reason for marriage to be monogamous; does that mean it also has to
be
exclusively heterosexual?
BUT THAT brings us to the complementarity of the sexes, a concept so
politically incorrect that even to mention it these days is to invite
ridicule. For if it implies anything, the complementarity of the sexes
implies
that men and women are different--and that, where the formation of
families
and the rearing of children are concerned, heterosexual parents are
and should
be preferred to homosexual parents: two ideas that are anathema to
radical
feminists and gay activists alike. Nevertheless, whether it is a biologically
based fact or a cultural artifact, or both, the complementarity of
the sexes
is real, and it is not about to disappear. And a good thing, too, since
the
stability of marriage depends on it.
In speaking of the complementarity of the sexes, I do not have in mind
the old
"division of the spheres"--the doctrine that, to put it crudely, men's
natural
place is to occupy themselves with labor outside the home while women's
natural bent is to care for hearth and children. But neither is that
idea to
be lightly disparaged. True, increasing numbers of women work outside
the home
these days, and their access to prestigious and highly remunerative
jobs is
approaching that of men. But when it comes to sex and marriage, the
old
patterns, the old attitudes, and the old instincts stubbornly refuse
to lie
down and die. The woman who pulls down a six-figure salary still waits
for a
man to call for a date, and the woman who comfortably commands men
at the
office still waits for a man to hold the door open for her. In our
fantasies
and in the details of our intimate lives, as in our popular songs,
the
complementarity of the sexes lives on, and will not be eradicated.
This complementarity is absolutely crucial for married life. To Andrew
Sullivan, it is the institution of marriage itself that "domesticates"
men.
But he has it wrong, or at best half-right: it is women who domesticate
men.
This is hardly to say that women themselves are never promiscuous;
it is to
say, rather, that what characteristically leads a man to abandon the
quest for
sexual conquest and, as the phrase has it, settle down and raise a
family is
the companionship and (yes) the possession of a beloved woman. Upon
this basic
dynamic of sexual coupling, society puts its imprimatur in the form
of
legalized marriage and, at least until recently, has also put its sanctions
in
the laws regulating divorce, laws that were typically much harder on
men as
the "naturally" promiscuous partners than on women.
There is still another aspect to the complementarity of the sexes that
might
be mentioned in this context, and that is hierarchy. If a man's proprietary
interest in wife and family--his sense of possession and responsibility--is
what both induces and permits him to give up the restless search for
sexual
conquest, the maintenance of this interest depends on, at a minimum,
the
tokens of entitlement suggested (again, however risibly to feminists
and
others) by the image of a home as a castle and the father and husband
as its
king. Of course, everyone knows and has always known that this kingship
is
more often symbolic than real: a rough sort of equality has always
lain hidden
under the idea of heterosexual hierarchy, and the question of who is
the
conqueror and who the conquered as between men and women is one of
the oldest
themes of high literature and folk humor alike. There is plenty of
winning and
losing all around.
But, to put it plainly, what the Promise Keepers have the audacity to
say out
loud about a man's authority within the marriage bond remains, in subtler
form, the formula of heterosexual marital success. The mere fact that,
to the
abiding frustration of feminists, 90 percent of married American women
still
take their husbands' surnames, while only 2 percent retain their maiden
names
alone, is powerful testimony to the enduring relevance of this ageless
and
complex drama of pursuit and possession by means of which individual
men and
women complete and "own" one another exclusively.
IN SUM, to suppose that legally conferring the word "marriage" on the
union of
two gay men will somehow magically domesticate them both is to indulge
in
fantasy; only sexual complementarity can do that. The state can reinforce
the
effect, but it cannot create it out of whole cloth.
In saying all this, I am merely reiterating something that heterosexual
men
and women have always known. More significantly, it is something that
at least
one segment of the homosexual community has been similarly frank to
affirm:
the segment, that is, that acknowledges the difference between heterosexuality
and homosexuality. In contrast to moderates and "conservatives" like
Andrew
Sullivan, who consistently play down that difference in order to promote
their
vision of gays as monogamists-in-the-making, radical gays have argued--more
knowledgeably, more powerfully, and more vocally than any opponent
of same-sex
marriage would dare to do--that homosexuality, and particularly male
homosexuality, is by its very nature incompatible with the norms of
traditional monogamous marriage.
Such people are represented most prominently in the trendy academic
discipline
known as "queer theory." Some of them simply scoff at the idea of same-sex
marriage as a contradiction in terms, and will have nothing to do with
it. But
for others, the prospect of legalizing same-sex marriage is in fact
quite
attractive--because, in making a mockery of the forms and traditions
of
monogamous unions, it holds out the promise of eventually undoing the
institution altogether.
Take, for instance, Gretchen Stiers, a lesbian theorist and advocate
of gay
marriage: "Two women or two men who marry subvert the belief that women
and
men take on separate but complementary roles with marriage and overtly
resist
the notion that marriage functions to support specifically defined
gender
roles." Indeed, in her recent book, From This Day Forward, the best
study to
date of gay and lesbian attitudes on these matters, Stiers shows that
many
homosexuals who disdain the idea of conventional marriage or even "commitment
ceremonies" would nonetheless marry for the "bennies"--that is, the
legal and
financial benefits involved (such as shared health insurance). Far
from
reinforcing the marriage ideal, then, these couples would in effect
be putting
into practice the program of cultural "resistance and subversion" that
she and
other queer theorists favor.
Or take Michael Bronski, another radical advocate of same-sex marriage
for
whom "homophobia" is hardly an irrational prejudice but a "completely
rational
fear." After all, writes Bronski, homosexuality posits "a sexuality
that is
justified by pleasure alone" and that is "completely divorced from
the burden
of reproduction"; as such, it "strikes at the heart of the organization
of
Western culture and societies," destabilizing both monogamous marriage
and the
role of two sexually complementary parents within the nuclear family.
Nor does one have to look only to the radicals for a recognition of
the
subversive potential of gay marriage. William Eskridge, who like Andrew
Sullivan lauds its power to tame and civilize promiscuous gay men,
also
frankly hopes that the institutionalization of same-sex marriage will
in turn
encourage a greater experimentation with all family forms. Gay marriages
are
bound to be more "fluid," in Eskridge's term, not so much because homosexual
men will be less constrained by notions of fidelity but because, where
children are concerned, sperm donors and others will be incorporated
into
"novel family configurations." Thanks to the example set by these
"configurations," we can look forward to all sorts of beneficial changes
in
the structure of Western marriage.
>From this perspective, in short, gay marriage represents but a critical
first
step toward the legitimation of multipartner marriages and then, perhaps,
the
eventual elimination of state-sanctioned marriage as we have known
it. Once
gay male couples with open sexual relationships or lesbian couples
with
de-facto families are legally married, the way will be open to even
more
imaginative combinations. On what grounds, for instance, could the
sperm donor
and aging rock star David Crosby be denied the right to join in matrimony
with
both the lesbian rock singer Melissa Etheridge and her lover Julie
Cypher, the
"mothers" of his child?
ENTER, NOW, polygamy, an idea so outrageously offensive to Andrew Sullivan
that he held William J. Bennett up to scorn for raising it a few short
years
ago. But those same years, as it happens, have seen the rise of a movement,
known delicately as "polyamory," many of whose proponents are indeed
"poised,"
in Sullivan's derisive words, "to exploit same-sex marriage and return
the
republic to polygamous abandon."
Although exact numbers are hard to come by, and one does not wish to
exaggerate, one measure of the growth of the polyamorist idea is the
jump in
Web-based support groups from three to upward of 250. A polyamorist
organization, Loving More, now holds two conferences a year, and a
magazine
under the same name claims a circulation of 10,000 and growing. The
movement
even boasts a cause celebre in the case of April Divilbiss, a woman
living
openly with two "husbands" whose "immoral life-style" resulted in a
court's
awarding custody of her child to a grandparent. A defense fund has
been set up
for her, and the case has attracted the usual media attention, figuring
centrally, for example, in the full-page article Time magazine devoted
to the
polyamorist movement last year.
The most common form of polyamory is "couple-centered," essentially
an updated
version of that ill-fated experiment of the 70's, the "open marriage."
Couples
attend sex parties together or meet prospective partners through ads
or
Internet chat rooms. Some prefer three-way sex, while others have sex
only
with other couples; some insist on the presence of their "spouse,"
while
others permit one partner to go off on his or her own, on condition
that no
emotional involvement will ensue. (Of course, exactly as in open marriage,
these outside relationships frequently lead, inside, to jealousy and
breakup.)
Although polyamorist couples are predominantly heterosexual, homosexuals
are
involved as well.
In addition to the couple-centered kind, which is perhaps familiar enough,
there are two more innovative forms of polyamorous relationship: so-called
group marriages, and networks of sexual connection that are even more
open and
"fluid" (to use William Eskridge's word). Group marriages can consist
of
anywhere between three and six adults who live together, sharing finances,
children, and household responsibilities. Every adult is expected to
be in a
sexual relationship with others in the group, and if bisexuals are
involved
they may have sex with both men and women. The groups themselves are
usually
closed, although new members can join if all the existing partners
agree. In
the still looser forms of "polyfidelity," the group forms and re-forms
according to shifting tastes and sexual orientations. Polyamory websites
regularly describe multipartner sexual liaisons among gay, straight,
and
bisexual individuals.
Needless to say, the loss of autonomy and the high potential for conflict
in
all of these arrangements do not exactly make for stability, and (as
in
60's-style communes) one can well imagine that the fate of the children
involved is particularly harsh. But that hardly deters the enthusiasts,
who,
spurred by the success of the gay-marriage movement, see legalized
polyamory
as the wave of the future. One such enthusiast, a de-facto polyamorist
though
she may never have heard the word, is the respected mainstream feminist
Barbara Ehrenreich, who has forecast the rise of a whole variety of
personal
arrangements entered into voluntarily by consenting parties and protected
by
law. Although entry into and exit from these associations would be
free, the
marriage contract as we know it would be replaced by a parenting contract
in
which the parties agreed to provide in perpetuity for whatever offspring
might
emerge from their shifting liaisons; as for the children themselves,
they
could be raised in, for example, mixed-sex communes whose residents
were both
gay and straight.
Ehrenreich and the polyamorists are hardly unaware of the liabilities
attendant upon their utopian schemes. Polyamory websites are filled
with
chatter about techniques for overcoming the effects of sexual jealousy,
as,
again and again, the seething passion for open-ended emotional exploration
yields agonies of personal humiliation and betrayal, not to mention
the
smash-up of innocent children's lives (which does in fact usually go
unmentioned). But, bringing us full circle, the polyamorists also insist
there
must be a cure for this debility: if other cultures can do it, we can,
too.
After all, they point out helpfully, many Pacific Island societies
have
permitted multiple and shifting sexual unions, and the majority of
non-Western
cultures also feature complex networks of aunts, uncles, and other
kin to
nurture the children. Why not us?
Why not, indeed? For sheer amusement, it would almost be worth it to
see how
long a fiercely willful feminist like Barbara Ehrenreich would last
in a real
Pacific Island society, with its tightly bound groups of kin, its intricate
rules of respect, its complex and often rigid hierarchies, and its
constant
demands for personal sacrifice. Indeed, it is tempting to laugh at
all these
laborious re-creations, whether in theory or in practice, of some of
the most
disastrous social experiments of the last 40 years. But they are even
less
laughable this time around than they were in the 1960's and 70's. For
now, in
the form of the movement for legalized gay marriage, the machinery
of the
state itself has, for the first time, been mobilized to sanction, bless,
and
protect those very same experiments.
ULTIMATELY, IT may be that what lies behind the demand for same-sex
marriage,
whether couched in conservative or in "civil-rights" terms, is a bid
to erase
entirely the stigma of homosexuality. That bid is utopian; as radical
gays
like Michael Bronski acknowledge, the stigma arises from the fundamental
separation between homosexuality and reproduction, which is to say
from the
fundamental fact that the world is, for the overwhelming part, heterosexual.
Nevertheless, in pursuit of this utopian end, we are being asked to
transform,
at unknown cost to ourselves and to future generations, the central
institution of our society. And we are being admonished that to reject
this
demand is to repudiate our "common humanity" with those who are advancing
it:
that is, to repudiate them as persons.
That is simply not so. There is not the slightest evidence that either
the
civil status of homosexuals or the increased sympathy and respect they
now
enjoy in America will in the least suffer from a continued refusal
to redefine
marriage so as to include homosexual unions. The real danger, rather,
lies in
the opposite direction--in the emptying-out of every last vestige of
meaning
from an institution already under siege by the disintegrative sexual
and
social forces of the last decades. If ever there was a place to draw
a line,
this is it.
"What is distinctive about marriage," wrote James Q. Wilson four years
ago in
COMMENTARY, "is that it is an institution created to sustain child-rearing."
The reason that role is "entrusted in principle to married heterosexual
couples," he added, is "because after much experimentation--several
thousand
years, more or less--we have found nothing else that works as well."
It would
be hard to improve on Wilson's quiet formulation of the case. Yet today,
the
war against this "institution created to sustain child-rearing"--that
is,
against marriage and the family--continues in force. Spearheaded by
the
campaign for same-sex unions, and under the reassuring but radically
false
guise of preserving marriage and the family, it is, in fact, intensifying.
For
that reason, among a host of others, it ought to be resisted--firmly,
politely, but above all unashamedly.
STANLEY N. KURTZ, a new contributor, is an anthropologist and an adjunct
senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is currently working on a
book about
feminism.
-- End --