Mary Ann Warren

Critical Reading Questions

1.   What does Warren mean by the expression 'morally human?  What does she mean by the expression 'genetically human'?  Why is this distinction an important distinction in the abortion context, according to Warren?  What does Warren mean by "the moral community"?

2.  Does Warren mean the same thing by "person" that she means by "human"?  Quote passages from the essay that support your answer here.  What criteria does Warren offer being human in the moral sense?  Present these in as much detail as she does.

3.  Do you agree with Warren's criteria for being human in the moral sense?  If not, explain what you find troublesome about her criteria, and defend your view against hers.

4.  Explain Warren's 'space-traveler' scenario defense (the first of the two 'space-traveler' scenarios she offers) of the criteria that she offers for being human in the moral sense.  After explaining what Warren thinks her 'space-traveler' shows,  say whether or not you think Warren's 'space-traveller' example shows what she thinks it shows.

5.  Suppose there are beings on other planets that are not genetically human.  Do you think that the fact that they are not human necessarily exclude them from the moral community, as far as Warren is concerned?  Explain your answer. Suppose there are angels;  Are angels genetically human? Would Warren think it is permissible to  hunt angels for sport?

6.  What  does Warren say about potentiality/potential persons and the rights they (would) have as far as the fetus/mother relationship is concerned?  Do you think that a potential person does have (or should have) the same rights as a full-fledged person? Explain why/why not!   Do you think that a potential adult should have the same rights as a full-fledged adult? Defend/ Explain your answers

7.  Explain Warrens second 'space-traveler' thought experiment, explain what point she thinks she makes with it, and explain/defend your own view as to whether she is  successful in showing what she thinks she shows with this example.

8.   Because the fetus has no rights against the woman carrying it, Warren says, there is nothing immoral about having a late-term abortion in order to take a European vacation.  Are there moral considerations she neglects?  If you think so, what are they?  Defend your view.

7.   Warren compares the moral reasons for not killing an infant to the moral reasons for not destroying a work of art. Explain her argumentation/point here.  Do you agree or disagree?

8. Explain Warren's attempt to deal with the fact that her criteria seem to make it permissible to terminate infants (infanticide).   Explain exactly what is right or what is wrong with Warren's response to the charge that her criteria allow infanticide.  Defend your view.

9.   Explain what you think Warren would say to the following argument:

No one knows whether or not the fetus is a person during pregnancy, so, since one must allow that it might be a person, one must act as though it is a person.  That is, if there is any chance at all that it is a person, one may not terminate the pregnancy.

In Warren's essay (below), the remarks/questions in red tpe are mine-- Dr. Armstrong

1. On the Definition of "Human"

One reason why this vital second question is so frequently overlooked in the debate over the moral status of abortion is that the term "human" has two distinct, but not often distinguished, senses. This fact results in a slide of meaning, which serves to conceal the fallaciousness of the traditional argument that since (1) it is wrong to kill innocent human being, and (2) fetuses are innocent human beings, then (3) it is wrong to kill fetuses. For if "human" is used in the same sense in both (1) and (2) then, whichever of the two senses is meant, one of these premises is question-begging. And if it is used in two different senses then of course the conclusion doesn't follow.
   Thus, (1) is a self-evident moral truth, and avoids begging the question about abortion only if "human being" is used to mean something like "a full-fledged member ofthe moral community." (It may or may not also be meant to refer exclusively to members of the species Homo Sapiens.) We may call this the moral sense of"human." It is not to be confused with what we will call the genetic sense, i.e, the sense in which any member of the species is a human being, and no member ofany other species could be. If (1) is acceptable only if the moral sense is intended, (2) is non-question-begging only if what is intended is the genetic sense.

[When Warren is talking about "the moral sense of "human"" and "the genetic sense of "human"", she is marking the distinction that we have marked with "human person" and "biologically human".]

   In "Deciding Who Is Human' Noonan argues for the classification of fetuses with human beings by pointing to the presence of the full genetic code, and the potential capacity for rational thought (p. 135). It is clear that what he needs to show, for his version of the traditional argument to be valid, is that fetuses are human in the moral sense, the sense in which it is analytically true that all human beings have full moral rights. But, in the absence of any argument showing that whatever is genetically human is also morally human, and he gives none, nothing more than genetic humanity can be demonstrated by the presence ofthe human genetic code. And, as we will see, the potential capacity for rational thought can at most show that an entity has the potential for becoming human in the moral sense.

2. Defining the Moral Community

Can it be established that genetic humanity (biologically human) is sufficient for moral humanity [human person-hood]! I think that there are very good reasons for not defining the moral community in this way. I would like to suggest an alternative way of defining the moral community, which I will argue for only to the extent of explaining why it is, or should be, self-evident. The suggestion is simply that the moral community consists of all and only people, rather than all and only human beings and probably the best way of demonstrating its self-evidence is by considering the concept of personhood, to see what sorts of entity are and are not persons, and what the decision that a being is or is not a person implies about its moral rights. What characteristics entitle an entity to be considered a person? This is obviously not the place to attempt a complete analysis of the concept of personhood, but we do not need such a fully adequate analysis just to determine whether and why a fetus is or isn't a person we need is a rough and approximate list ofthe most basic criteria ofpersonhood, and some idea ofwhich, or how many, of these an entity must satisfy  in order to properly be considered a person.

    In searching for such criteria, it is useful to look beyond the set of people with whom we are acquainted, and ask how we would decide whether a totally alien being was a person or not. (For we have no right to assume that genetic humanity is necessary for personhood.) Imagine a space traveler who lands on an unknown planet and encounters a race ofbeings utterly unlike any he has ever seen or heard of. If he wants to be sure of behaving morally toward these beings, he has to somehow decide whether they are people, and hence have full moral rights, or whether they are the sort of thing which he need not feel guilty about treating as, for example, a source of food.
   How should he go about making this decision! If he has some anthropological background, he might look for such things as religion, art, and the manufacturing oftools, weapons, or shelters, since these factors have been used to distinguish our human from our prehuman ancestors, in what seems to be closer to the moral than the genetic sense of "human."And no doubt he would be right to consider the presence of such factors as good evidence that the alien beings were people, and morally human. It would, however, be overly anthropocentric of him to take the absence of these things as adequate evidence that they were not, since we can imagine people who have progressed beyond, or evolved without ever developing, these cultural characteristics.

[In the above paragraph Warren presents her first 'space-traveler'  thought experiment, asking you to think about what criteria you would use to decide whether or not something is a person if  it was a living thing that was totally unfamiliar to you.  The purpose of this thought experiment is to help you think about the 'personhood' charcteristics in a context that isn't as emotion-laden as the abortion context.  Think about how you would show that this doesn't show what Warren thinks it shows, if you think that it doesn't.  Here, and elsewhere, keep in mind that difference of view-- your disagreement-- is the beginning of your discussion with Warren, not the end.  Warren is attempting to defend her radcial view with what she takes to be evidence that supports her claims.  When you object, try to respond in the same way.]

I suggest that the traits which are most central to the concept of personhood, or humanity in the moral sense, are, very roughly, the following:
 

1.  consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain;

2.  reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems);

3.  self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control)

4.  the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages ofan indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number ofpossible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics;

5.  the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both.
 

   Admittedly, there are apt to be a great many problems involved in formulating precise definitions ofthese criteria, let alone in developing universally valid behavioral criteria for deciding when they apply. But I will assume that both we and our explorer know approximately what (1)-(5) mean, and that he is also able to determine whether or not they apply. How, then, should he use his finding to decide whether or not the alien beings are people! We needn't suppose that an entity must have all of these attributes to be properly considered a person; (1) and (2) alone may well be sufficient for personhood, and quite probably (1)-(3) are sufficient. Neither do we need to insist that any one ofthese criteria is necessary for personhood, although once again (1) and (2) look like fairly good candidates for necessary conditions, as does (3), if"activity" is construed so as to include the activity of reasoning.
   All we need to claim, to demonstrate that a fetus is not a person, is that any being which satisfies none of(l)-(5) is certainly not a person. I consider this claim to be so obvious that I think anyone who denied it, and claimed that a being which satisfied none of(l)-(5) was a person all the same, would thereby demonstrate that he had no notion at all of what a person is--perhaps because he had confused the concept of a person with that of  genetic humanity. If the opponents of abortion were to deny the appropriateness of these five criteria, I do not know what further arguments would convince them.We would probably have to admit that our conceptual schemes are indeed irreconcilably different, and that our dispute could not be settled objectively.

[Warren thinks she doesn't need to be more specific in terms of the criteria (which ones are more important, which less important)  because she thinks that the fetus doesn't satisfy any of the five characteristics at any time during pregnancy]

 I do not expect this to happen, however, since I think that the concept of a person is one which is very nearly universal (to people), and that it is common to both pro-abortionists and anti-abortionists, even though neither group has fully realized the relevance of this concept to the resolution of their dispute. Furthermore, I think that on reflection even the antiabortionists ought to agree not only that (1)-(5) are central to the concept of personhood, but also that it is apart of this concept that all and only people have full moral rights.The concept of a person is in part a moral concept; once we have admitted that X is a person we have recognized, even ifwe have not agreed to respect, X's right to be treated as a member of the moral community. It is true that the claim that X is a human being is more commonly voiced as part of an appeal to treat X decently than is the claim that X is a person, but this is either because "human being" is here used in the sense which implies personhood, or because the genetic and moral senses of "human" have been confused.

    Note if(l)-(5) are indeed the primary criteria of personhood, then it is clear that genetic humanity is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing that an entity is a person. Some human beings are not people, and there may be people who are not human being.A man or woman whose consciousness has been permanently obliterated but who remains alive is a human being which is no longer a person; defective human beings, with no appreciable mental capacity, are not and presumable never will be people; and a fetus is a human being which is not yet a person, and which therefore cannot coherently be said to have full moral rights. Citizens of the next century should be prepared to recognize highly advanced, self-aware robots or computers, should such be developed, and intelligent inhabitants of other worlds, should such be found, as people in the fullest sense, and to respect their moral rights. But to ascribe full moral rights to an entity which is not a person is as absurd as to ascribe moral obligations and responsibilities to such an entity.

[Do you agree with Warren's assertions about who is a person and who is not in the above paragraph-- the assertions in italics. Make sure you understand what she is saying and, then, give some thought to what you would say to show that she is wrong. ]

3. Fetal Development and the Right to Life

Two problems arise in the application of these suggestions for the definition ofthe moral community to the determination ofthe precise moral status ofa human fetus. Given that the paradigm example of a person is a normal adult human being, then (1) How like this paradigm, in particular how far advanced since conception, does a human being need to be before it begins to have a right to life by virtue, not of being fully a person as ofyet, but of being like a person! and (2) To what extent, if any, does the fact that a fetus has the potential for becoming a person endow it with some ofthe same rights! Each of these questions requires some comment. In answering the first question, we need not attempt a detailed consideration ofthe moral rights of organisms which are not developed enough, aware enough, intelligent enough, etc., to be considered people, but which resemble people in some respects. It does seem reasonable to suggest that the more like a person, in the relevant respects, a being is, the stronger is the case for regarding it as having a right to life, and indeed the stronger its right to life is.Thus we ought to take seriously the suggestion that, insofar as "the human individual develops biologically in a continuous fashion ...the rights of a human person might develop in the same way.  But we must keep in mind that the attributes which are relevant in determining whether or not an entity is enough like a person to be regarded as having some of the same moral rights are no different from those which are relevant to determining whether or not it is a fully a person-i.e, are no different from (l)-(5)--and that being genetically human, or having recognizably human facial and other physical features, or detectable brain activity, or the capacity to survive outside the uterus, is simply not among these relevant attributes.Even thougha seven to eight-month fetus has features which make it apt to arouse in us almost the same power~ protective instinct as is commonly aroused by a small infant, nevertheless it is not significantly more personlike than is a very small embryo. It is somewhat more personlike; it can apparently feel and respond to pain, and it may even have a rudimentary form of consciousness, insofar as its brain is quite active. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that it is not fully conscious, in the way that an infant of a few months is, and that it cannot reason, or communicate messages ofindefinitely many sorts, does not engage in self-motivated activity, and has no selfawareness.Thus, in the relevant respects, a fetus, even a full developed one, is considerably less personlike than is the average mature mammal, indeed the average fish. And I think that a rational person must conclude that if the right to life of a fetus is to be based upon its resemblance to a person, then it cannot be said to have any more right to life than,let us say, a newborn guppy (which also seems to be capable offeeling pain), and that right ofthat magnitude could never override a woman's right to obtain an abortion, at any stage of her pregnancy. There may, of course, be other arguments in favor ofplacing legal limits upon the stage ofpregnancy in which an abortion may be performed. Given the relative safety ofthe new techniques of artificially inducing labor during the third trimester, the danger to the woman's life or health is no longer such an argument. Neither is the fact that people tend to respond to the thought ofabortion in the later stages ofpregnancy with emotional repulsion, since mere emotional responses cannot take the place ofmoral reasoning in determining what ought to be permitted. Nor, finally, is the frequently heard argument that legalizing abortion, especially late in the pregnancy, may erode the level of respect for human life, leading, perhaps, to an increase in unjustified euthanasia and other crimes. For this threat, ifit is a threat, can be better met by education people to the kinds ofmoral distinction which we are making here than by limiting access to abortion (which limitation may, in its disregard for the rights of women, be just as damaging to the level ofrespect for human rights).

    Thus, since the fact that even a fully developed fetus is not personlike enough to have a significant right to life on the basis of its personlikeness shows that no legal restrictions upon the stage of pregnancy in which an abortion may be performed can be justified on the grounds that we should protect the rights ofthe older fetus; and since there is no other apparentjustification for such restrictions, we may conclude that they are entirely unjustified. Whether or not it would be indecent (whatever that means) for a woman in her seventh month to obtain an abortion just to avoid having to postpone a trip to Europe, it would not, in itself, be immoral, and therefore it ought to be permitted.

4. Potential Personhood and Right to Life

We have seen that a fetus does not resemble a person in any way which can support the claim that it has even some of the same rights. But what about its potential, the fact that if nurtured and allowed to develop naturally it will very probably become a person? Doesn't that alone give it at least some right to life! It is hard to deny that the fact that an entity is a potential person is a strong prima facie reason for not destroying it; but we need not conclude from this that a potential person has a right to life, by virtue of that potential. It may be that our feeling that it is better, other things being equal, not to destroy a potential person is better explained by the fact that potential people are still (felt to be) an invaluable resource, not to be lightly squandered. Surely, if every speck of dust were a potential person, we would be much less apt to conclude that every potential person has a right to become actual.

    Still, we do not need to insist that a potential person has no right to life whatever.There may well be something immoral, and notjust imprudent, about wantonly destroying potential people, when doing so isn't necessary to protect anyone's rights. But even ifa potential person does have some prima facie right to life, such a right could not possible outweigh the right of a woman to obtain an abortion, since the right of any actual person invariably outweigh those of any potential person, whenever the two conflict. Since this may not be immediately obvious in the case of a human, fetus, let us look at another case.

   Suppose that our space explorer falls into the hand of an alien culture, whose scientists decide to create a few hundred thousand or more human beings, by breaking his body into its component cells, and using these to create fully developed   human beings, with, of course, his genetic code. We may imagine that each ofthese newly created men will have all of the original man's abilities, skills, knowledge, and so on. and also have an indi1 vidual self-concept, in short that each of them will be a bona fide (though hardly unique) person. Imagine that the whole project will take only seconds, and that its chances ofsuccess are extremely high, and that our explorer knows all of this, and also knows that these people will be treated fairly. I maintain that in such a situation he would have every right to escape if he could, and thus to deprive all ofthese potential people oftheir potential lives;  for his right to life outweighs all of theirs together, in spite of the fact that they are all genetically human, all innocent, and all have a very high probability of becoming people very soon, if only he refrains from acting.

   Indeed, I think he would have a right to escape even if it were not his life which the alien scientists planned to take, but only a year of his freedom, or indeed, only a day. Nor would he be obligated to stay if he had gotten captured (thus bringing all these people-potentials into existence) because of his own carelessness, or even if he had done so deliberately, knowing the consequences. Regardless of how he got captured, he is not morally obligat ed to remain in captivity for any period of time for the sake ofpermitting any number ofpotential people to come into actuality, so great is the margin by which one actual person's right to liberty outweighs whatever right to life even a hundred thousand potential people have.And it seems reasonable to conclude that the rights of a woman : will outweigh by a similar margin whatever right to life a fetus may have by virtue ofits potential personhood.

[The above two paragraphs include Warren's second 'space-traveler' thought experiment.  Make sure you know what she thinks it shows]

 Thus, neither a fetus's resemblance to a person, nor its potential for becoming a person provides any basis whatever for the claim that it has any significant right to life. Consequently, a woman's right to protect her health, happiness, freedom, and even her life by terminating an unwanted pregnancy, will always override whatever right to life may appropriate to ascribe to a fetus, even a fully developed one. And thus, in the absence of any overwhelming social need for every possible child, the laws which restrict the right to obtain an abortion, or limit the period ofpregnancy during which an abortion may be performed, are a wholly unjustified violation of a woman's most basic moral and constitutional rights.'

POSTSCRlPT ON lNFANTlClDE

Since the publication of this article, many people have written to point out that my argument appears to justify not only abortion, but infanticide as well. For a newborn infant is not significantly more personlike than an advanced fetus, and consequently it would seem that if the destruction of the latter is permissible so too must be that of the former. Inasmuch as most people, regardless ofhow othey feel about the morality of abortion, consider infanticide a form ofmurder, this might appear to represent a serious flaw in my argument.

    Now, if I am right in holding that it is only people who have a full-fledged right to life, and who can be murdered, and if the criteria of personhood are as I have described them, then it obviously follows that killing newborn infants isn't murder. It does not follow, however, that infanticide is permissible, for two reasons. In the first place, it would be wrong, at least in this country and in this period ofhistory, and other things being equal, to kill a newborn infant, because even ifits parents do not want it and would not suffer from its destruction, there are other people who would like to have it, and would, in all probability, be deprived oaf great deal ofpleasure by its destruction.Thus, infanticide is wrong for reasons analogous to those which make it wrong to wantonly destroy natural resources, or great works ofart.
   Second, most people, at least in this country, value infants and would much prefer that they be preserved, even if foster parents are not immediately available. Most of us would rather be taxed to support orphanages than allow unwanted infants to be destroyed. So long as there are people who want an infant preserved, and who are willing and able to provide the means of caring for it, under reasonably humane conditions, it is, ceteris parabis, wrong to destroy it.

 But, it might be replied, if this argument shows that infanticide is wrong, at least at this time and in this country, doesn't it also show that abortion is wrong! After all, many people value fetuses, are disturbed by their destruction, and would much prefer that they be preserved, even at some cost to themselves. Furthermore, as a potential source of pleasure to some foster family,a fetus is just as valuable as an infant. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two cases: so long as the fetus is unborn, its preservation, contrary to the wishes ofthe pregnant woman, violates her rights to freedom, happiness, and self-determination. Her rights override the rights of those who would like the fetus preserved,just as ifsomeone's life or limb is threatened by a wild animal, his right to protect himselfby destroying the animal overrides the rights ofthose who would prefer that the animal not be harmed.

   The minute the infant is born, however, its preservation no longer violates any ofits mother's rights, even ifshe wants it destroyed, because she is able to put it up for adoption. Consequently, while the moment ofbirth does not mark any sharp discontinuity in the degree to which an infant possesses the right to life, it does mark the end ofits mother's right to determine its fate. Indeed, ifabortion could be performed without killing the fetus, she would never possess the right to have the fetus destroyed, for the same reasons that she has no right to have an infant destroyed.

   On the other hand, it follows from my argument that when an unwanted or defective infant is born into a society which cannot afford and/or is not wlling to care for it, then its destruction is permissible. This conclusion will, no doubt, strike many people as heartless and immoral; but remember that the very existence ofpeople who feel this way,and who are willing and able to provide care for unwanted infants, is reason enough to conclude that they should be preserved.