from On Liberty

 In "On Liberty" Mill explores the conflict in modern democracy between majority rule and minority liberty. Mill
believed that protection of minority rights from social coercion by the majority was essential for moral progress and
individual happiness. In his essay he asks how we can distinguish legitimate, democratic authority from unwarranted
intolerance of minority rights. Applying the principle of utility, Mill concluded that there are only two legitimate
grounds for social coercion: (1) to prevent someone from harming others (the no-harm principle) and (2) to
prevent people from interfering with other people's legitimate interests.

 "On Liberty" remains one of the most important treatises in discussions on issues that involve a clash between
majority views and minority rights such as freedom of the press, censorship of pornography and free speech,
recreational drug use, racism, samesex marriage, and assisted suicide.

Critical Reading Questions

While reading through these passages from Mill, make a note of points that he makes with which you disagree.  State and defend your disagreement as cleary as possible.

I. What was the nature of the struggle between liberty and authority prior to the American and French revolutions?
How has democracy changed the nature of this struggle?

2. What does "self-government" mean in a democracy?

3. What does Mill mean by the "tyranny of the majority"?

4. Why does society need to be on its guard against the tyranny of the majority? How can we, as a society, protect
ourselves against the tyranny of the majority?

5.  Can you think of any instances where the 'tyranny of the majority' needs to be stopped in contemporary U. S. society.

6. What, according to Mill, is the only justification for interfering with someone's liberty rights?

7.  What is the one simple principle the statement and defense of which is the purpose of Mill’s essay?  This principle is often known as Mill’s ‘harm’ principle, or as Mill’s ‘liberty’ principle.  Produce examples from contemporary U.S. society that violate the principle.

8. What, according to Mill, is "the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions"?  What do you think this means in practical terms?

9. Why is freedom of speech so important to Mill? Do you agree with Mill or disagree?  Explain your position.

10.  Mill defends the freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion on four grounds:  what are the four grounds that Mill provides?

11. What, according to Mill, is the ingredient of human happiness that is often given little or no importance?  Explain what you think Mill means here.

12.  With respect to the ‘ingredient’ that is the answer in question 11, what is the chief difficulty that it faces, according to Mill?  Explain what someone who disagrees with Mill might say here.

13.  Explain completely why Mill thinks that ‘independence of action, and disregard of custom’ are important.

14.  What does Mill say about ‘custom’ as a guide to human action?  What does he mean?  Agree or disagee with Mill and explain/defend your answer.  To the best of your ability, formulate an objection to Mill here, and defend your objection.
 
 

 Chapter I

 INTRODUCTORY

[1] The struggle between liberty and authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we
are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between
subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of
political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled....

[2] In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface and made itself felt as
one of the most powerful members of the community of nations,' and elective and responsible government became
subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such
phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of the
case. The "people" who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and
the "self-government" spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the
people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people -the
majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire
to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of
power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the
holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of
things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in
European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing
itself; and in political speculations "the tyranny of the majority"' is now generally included among the evils against
which society requires to be on its guard....

[3] Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the
tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil
penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development
and, if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters
to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion
with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a
good condition of human affairs as protection against political despotism....

[4] The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society
with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of
legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. Tojustify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him
must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to
society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign....

[5] I regard utility (When Mill speaks of utility, he is speaking as a 'utilitarian'.  Very roughly put, a utilitarian beleives that one should do what produces the greatest good/happiness for the greatest number of people-- Dr. Armstrong) as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on  the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of
individual spontaneity to external control only in respect to those actions of each which concern the interest of other
people. If anyone does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie cause for punishing him by law or, where legal
penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of
others which he may rightfully be compelled to perform, such as to give evidence in a court ofjustice, to bear his
fair share in the common defense or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he
enjoys the protection, and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow creature's life or
interposing to protect the defenseless against ill usage-things which whenever it is obviously a mans duty to do he
may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions
but by his inaction, and in either case he isjustly accountable to them for the injury...

[6] But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect
interest: comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself or, if it also affects
others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean
directly and in the first instance; for whatever affects himself may affect others through himself. and the objection
which may be grounded on this contingency will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate
region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience in
the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all
subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions
may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which
concerns other people, but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself and resting in great
part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and
pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though
they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual follows the
liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite for any purpose not involving
harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age and not forced or deceived.

[7] No society in which their liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual.  Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling
each to live as seems good to the rest....

 Chapter two.

OF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION

[8] The time, it is hoped, is gone by when any defense would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the
securities against corrupt or tyrannical government....

[9] Speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be apprehended that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so itmakes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it
conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by
their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as
noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion than when in opposition to it. If all
mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to
the owner, if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference
whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression
of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation -those who dissent
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose; what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth produced by its collision with error....

[10] There must be discussion to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yieldto fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value,
then, of human judgment depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be
placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of any person whose
judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of
his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as
much of it as was just, and to expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious.
Because he has felt that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a
subject is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which
it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it
in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing
his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into
practice, is the only stable foundation for ajust reliance on it....

[11] We have now recognized the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being
depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds, which we will now
briefly recapitulate:

[12] First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this
is to assume our own infallibility.

[13] Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and
since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of
adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

[14] Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground and preventing the
growth of any real and heart- felt conviction from reason or personal experience.

 Chapter 3.

 OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING.

[15]  SUCH BEING the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions- to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril.
                       ...

[16] As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so it is that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.
                  ...
[17]  In maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilisation, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for mankind.

[18] He who does anything because it is the custom makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be weakened, by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others, are not concerned) it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic.

                      ...

[19]  He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself.
                     ...

[20]  It will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it. To a certain extent it is admitted that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced; when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to co-exist with them, remain weak and inactive. It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak. There is no natural connection between strong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural connection is the other way. To say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. Strong impulses are but another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. Those who have most natural feeling are lways those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest self-control. It is through the cultivation of these that society both does its duty and protects its interests: not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made, because it knows not how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses are his own- are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture- is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character. Whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures-is not the better for containing many persons who have much character-and that a high general average of energy is not desirable.
                       ...

[21]  I have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs. But independence of action, and disregard of custom, are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that better modes action, and customs more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. There is no reason that all human existence should be constructed on some one or some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him unless they are either made to his measure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from: and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in the shape of their feet? If it were only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model.

[22]  But different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical, atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher nature are hindrances to another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable.
                         ...
 

 Discussion Questions.

1.  the use of marijuana; the use of heroin (you may put restrictions on the use if you like-- adults only, but you need  not); the use of alcohol.
2.   prostitution (restrictions if you like)
3.   same-sex marriages; multiple person marriages (three, four, whatever); marriages between closely related individuals-- first cousins; mothers-sons;  fathers-daughters; brothers-sisters.
4.  selling one’s own body parts-- a kidney, for example.
5.  sport-hunting-- (you can distinguish between different animals to be murdered killed if you  like, and between different means of murder- killing-- bow, shotgun, rifle, spear)
6.  hunting of humans (consenting adults only, of course)
7.  sexual activity with non-humans; with the dead.
8.  people stuffing their spouses/significant others (after death, of course)
9.   pornography
10.   Church attendance
11.   cloning humans

In each of the above, would you ban or not ban?  Explain/defend your position.

B.  Do you view it as your responsibility to try to change the moral views of those with whom you disagree?

C.  Do you believe that people should be allowed to make up their own minds about things?

D.  Is individual happiness important?  How important?  Is it important to be able to find out what makes you happy?

E. Explain what it means to respect other people as people.

F.  Can you think of some thing(s) that not everybody does, that they should do? What is it?  Would you make them do it, if it was up to you.

G.  Can you think of something that you think is an awful thing to do, that some others do not is an awful thing to do (they seem to like it).  Would you ban it by law, if it was up to you.

H.  Can you think of anything that you do, that is legal, that you know some others would/might make illegal if it were up to them?  Explain.

I.  Are there aspects of your life, of the lives of individuals,  that are nobody else's business?  Explain!  What would Mill say-- be as specific as you can.

J.  Does the government have an important role when it comes to teaching morality, as far as Mill is concerned?  As far as you are concerned?